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The Relationship Between the ISP Safe Harbors and the
Ordinary Rules of Copyright Liability
R. Anthony Reese*
I think that there is a general understanding abroad in the land about the
relationship between the ordinary principles of liability for copyright infringement
and the limits on liability for online service providers (OSPs) in sections 512(c) and
512(d). The basic view is that these sections depart from the traditional copyright
regime by protecting OSPs from claims of direct copyright infringement, but
basically follow the traditional copyright regime and allow secondary liability
claims against an OSP for infringements committed by users of the OSP‘s
services.1
In this view, section 512 is most notable for changing the rules governing
liability for direct infringement of copyright. A direct infringer is a party that itself
uses a copyrighted work in one of the ways that the Copyright Act reserves
exclusively to the copyright owner—reproduction, adaptation, distribution, public
performance or public display.2 Under the expansive statutory readings that many
courts have given to the scope of online conduct that comes within the copyright
owner‘s exclusive rights,3 many of an OSP‘s activities might lead to liability for
direct infringement. But section 512 provides that, if the OSP meets certain
conditions, it will not be liable as a direct infringer for certain types of activities.
Thus, section 512 is seen as shielding OSPs from otherwise potentially successful
claims of direct infringement.
At the same time, this view sees section 512 as preserving copyright owners‘
secondary liability claims against OSPs. Secondary liability claims are premised
not on a defendant‘s own unauthorized use of a copyrighted work in violation of
the owner‘s exclusive rights. Instead, secondary liability claims target a defendant
*
Arnold, White & Durkee Centennial Professor of Law, The University of Texas at Austin;
Visiting Professor, NYU School of Law, Spring 2009; Professor, UC Irvine School of Law (from 1 July
2009). Thanks to the symposium participants and to Christopher Leslie for their comments on earlier
versions of this Article, and to Jane O‘Connell and the staff of Tarlton Law Library for research
assistance. © 2009 R. Anthony Reese.
1. See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (―The [Online
Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation] Act [codified at § 512] does not abolish contributory
infringement.‖); CoStar Group Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 704 (D.Md. 2001)
(―Basically, the DMCA provides no safe harbor for vicarious infringement because it codifies both
elements of vicarious liability.‖).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
3. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993)
(temporary storage in RAM constitutes reproduction).
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who has contributed to some third party‘s act of direct infringement, or a defendant
who has a sufficiently close relationship with a third-party direct infringer such that
it is fair to hold the defendant liable for the infringement. In this view of section
512, an OSP‘s conduct or relationship that would lead to secondary liability under
ordinary common law principles of copyright law4 is essentially the same kind of
conduct or relationship that the statute specifies would disqualify the OSP from its
safe harbors. Such conduct or relationships would thus both remove the OSP from
the safe harbor, exposing it to ordinary secondary liability claims, and would
generally suffice to prove such claims.
So in this view, the section 512(c) and (d) safe harbors change the rules of the
game with respect to direct infringement, shielding an OSP from claims for which
it would otherwise likely be liable, but they essentially preserve the ordinary
principles of secondary liability, exposing an OSP to claims for contributory
infringement or vicarious liability that would otherwise likely succeed.
In this Article, I suggest that the general view just described is not entirely
correct. Part I explores OSP liability for direct infringement. Section 512 does
protect qualifying OSPs against liability. It is not clear, however, how significant
this protection is. In the years since section 512 was enacted in 1998, courts have
developed the ordinary principles of copyright infringement doctrine in the online
context, and some have interpreted direct infringement law so as to avoid holding
an OSP liable for merely carrying out routine internet communications on behalf of
its users without any knowledge of a user‘s infringement or any practical way to
detect it.5 As a result, at least in many instances, an OSP that fails to qualify for a
safe harbor‘s protection against direct infringement claims may nevertheless not
face liability for its actions as a direct infringer (though it may still find its conduct
judged under secondary liability principles). Thus, what appears to be the most
substantial safe harbor protection—the shield against direct infringement claims—
may in fact not be necessary in many circumstances.
Part II compares the elements of a common law claim for contributory
infringement or vicarious liability with the provisions of sections 512(c) and 512(d)
that disqualify an OSP from a safe harbor based either on its level of knowledge
about, or its level of control over, a user‘s infringing activity. The statutory
conditions that an OSP must meet in order to qualify for a safe harbor‘s protection
certainly reflect the contours of ordinary claims of contributory infringement and
4. The doctrines of secondary liability in copyright law are essentially judge made, and are not
spelled out in federal copyright legislation. The 1976 Act‘s legislative history indicates that the drafters
of that statute approved of the courts‘ recognition of secondary liability claims, but the statute as enacted
offered no details on such claims. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674. Amendments since 1976 have not added any general provisions on
secondary liability, and have only rarely addressed the topic even in specific contexts. See, e.g., 17
U.S.C. § 1008 (limiting secondary liability claims based on provision of analog and digital audio
recording devices and media).
5. See, e.g., CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004) (―[T]he ISP
should not be found liable as a direct infringer when its facility is used by a subscriber to violate a
copyright without intervening conduct of the ISP.‖).
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vicarious liability, but the precise details of the statutory requirements differ in
some ways from the elements of those claims. As a result, some conduct that
would lead a court to find contributory infringement or vicarious liability under
ordinary common law principles may not be enough to deprive an OSP of the safe
harbor‘s shield. Thus, sections 512(c) and 512(d) may not, in fact, preserve all
secondary liability claims against OSPs, but instead may protect OSPs from
liability in at least some instances where a claim for contributory infringement or
vicarious liability would otherwise succeed.6
I. LIABILITY FOR DIRECT INFRINGEMENT INSIDE AND OUTSIDE
THE SAFE HARBOR
The most straightforward type of infringement claim is a direct infringement
claim. The Copyright Act provides that ―[a]nyone who violates any of the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright‖ and
subject to the Act‘s remedies.7 A plaintiff copyright owner generally need not
prove anything about a defendant‘s knowledge, right and ability to control, or
direct financial interest in order to establish a direct infringement claim. The most
obvious difference between the ordinary copyright regime and the liability regime
of section 512 would seem to involve such direct infringement claims. If an OSP
comes within a safe harbor, then the OSP faces no liability for claims of direct
infringement—beyond being subject to very narrowly circumscribed injunctive
relief.8
The difference may not be as significant as it appears, however. Even outside
the safe harbors, OSPs may not face liability for direct infringement claims based
on their own activities (transmission, storage, etc.) on behalf of users. Section
512‘s approach of barring direct infringement liability but allowing secondary
liability (in some modified form) is, after all, modeled on the approach of the
landmark Netcom case. As that decision demonstrates, the ordinary copyright
liability regime had begun, even before enactment of section 512‘s safe harbors, to
reject direct infringement liability at least for some OSP conduct.9
In Netcom, the court essentially interpreted the statutory section on direct
infringement to mean that a defendant must engage in at least some ―volitional‖
conduct in order to be held liable as a direct infringer.10 And at least for some
6. This appears to be the intent of the drafters of an early version of the safe harbors. That
version was far less detailed than the version finally adopted, although the language of the early
version‘s conditions for qualifying for the safe harbors was quite similar to the final version‘s. The
committee report for the early version explained that ―[a]s to secondary liability [for OSPs,] the current
criteria for finding contributory infringement or vicarious liability are made clearer and somewhat more
difficult to satisfy.‖ H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 11 (1998) (emphasis added).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 512(j) (2006).
9. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc‘n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal.
1995).
10. Id. at 1370. The court‘s approach prefigures, to some extent, the question in the recent
Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. case regarding who is actually making the copy when
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important activities, the court concluded that the OSP was not engaged in such
volitional conduct and, therefore, could not be held liable under the ordinary
principles of direct infringement. Instead, if the OSP was to be held liable, it would
have to be under some form of secondary liability.11
Of course, Netcom was only a single district court opinion, of no direct
precedential force in subsequent cases. Nevertheless, at least one circuit court has
expressly adopted the Netcom approach to direct liability for at least some OSP
conduct.12 The Fourth Circuit in CoStar interpreted Netcom as having articulated a
volitional conduct element to the standard test for direct copyright infringement
under sections 501 and 106 of the Copyright Act, and praised that decision as
offering ―a particularly rational interpretation‖ of the statute.13 The court stated:
Agreeing with the analysis in Netcom, we hold that the automatic copying, storage,
and transmission of copyrighted materials, when instigated by others, does not render
an ISP strictly liable for copyright infringement under §§ 501 and 106 of the
Copyright Act. An ISP, however, can become liable indirectly upon a showing of
additional involvement sufficient to establish a contributory or vicarious violation of
the Act.14

At least one other circuit court seems to have taken the same approach.15 As a
result, when an OSP fails to qualify for a section 512 safe harbor and thus does not
enjoy a shield against direct infringement liability, courts may nonetheless evaluate
the OSP‘s liability for copyright infringement under principles of secondary
liability rather than under principles of direct infringement. While the safe harbor‘s
most significant benefit appears at first to be the protection it offers OSPs against
claims of direct infringement, it turns out that, at least in some circuits, OSPs do
not need a safe harbor‘s protection in order to avoid direct infringement liability.
Of course, the protection may be important in circuits that have not yet adopted (or
that decline to adopt) the Netcom approach, or if a court determines that some of
the OSP activity covered by section 512 involved the kind of volitional conduct by
the OSP that would make direct infringement liability appropriate even under that
approach. But the value of the safe harbor‘s shield against direct infringement

a cable TV subscriber uses a remote-storage DVR system to record a TV show. See 536 F.3d 121, 130
(2d Cir. 2008).
11. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372-73.
12. CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 548-52, 555 (4th Cir. 2004).
13. Id. at 551.
14. Id.
15. See Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 F. App‘x 833, 836 (3d Cir. 2007) (―[T]o state a direct
copyright infringement claim, a plaintiff must allege volitional conduct on the part of the defendant.‖)
(citing CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir. 2004) and Religious Tech. Ctr.
v. Netcom On-Line Commc‘n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995)). The Second
Circuit has also recently endorsed the Netcom view as a more general principle for determining who is
actually engaged in directly infringing conduct, in a case not involving an OSP. Cartoon Network LP,
LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). At least one district court has also taken the
Netcom approach to direct infringement. Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1056-57 (C.D. Cal.
2002).
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claims is surely somewhat less than it would be if courts routinely viewed typical
OSP activity as subject to direct infringement liability.
II. COMPARING THE SAFE HARBOR CONDITIONS AND SECONDARY
LIABILITY DOCTRINES
A. KNOWLEDGE-BASED DISQUALIFICATION FROM THE SAFE HARBORS AND
CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
Knowledge of infringing activity is one ground on which an OSP can be
excluded from the safe harbors. Sections 512(c) and 512(d) essentially immunize
an OSP from liability for copyright infringement that occurs by reason of the
provider‘s storing user material or providing information location tools as long as
the provider does not have certain kinds of knowledge regarding the infringing
material or activity.16 If the provider does meet certain knowledge requirements,
though, it loses the benefit of the safe harbor and must face a copyright owner‘s
infringement claims.
Here, the safe harbor regime substantially parallels common law contributory
infringement doctrine, which premises liability on the contributing defendant‘s
knowledge of the infringer‘s activity. The now classic statement of the elements of
a contributory infringement claim is that ―one who, with knowledge of the
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing
conduct of another, may be held liable as a ‗contributory‘ infringer.‖17 Courts have
generally indicated that a defendant has sufficient knowledge to be a contributory
infringer if the defendant actually knows of the infringing activity or if a reasonable
person in the defendant‘s position would have known of the activity.18
The requirements of sections 512(c)(1)(A) and 512(d)(1) are conceptually quite
similar to those of a contributory infringement claim. A defendant will not be
liable as a contributory infringer if she does not have actual or constructive
knowledge of the direct infringement. Similarly, an OSP that otherwise qualifies
under either section 512(c) or 512(d) will be immune from liability if it does not
have certain knowledge or awareness of infringing material or activity. And under
both the common law and the statutory safe harbors, a defendant will not face
liability unless it contributes to a third-party‘s infringement. Given the structural
similarities, it might appear that if a copyright owner could establish a prima facie
claim that an OSP engaged in contributory infringement by knowingly contributing
to a user‘s infringing activity, she would also be able to disqualify the OSP from
16. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(C), (d)(1), (d)(3) (2006).
17. Gershwin Publ‘g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
18. See, e.g., id. at 1162; Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11th Cir. 1987) (―The standard of
knowledge is objective: ‗Know, or have reason to know.‘‖); Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076
(9th Cir. 2004) (―We have interpreted the knowledge requirement for contributory copyright
infringement to include both those with actual knowledge and those who have reason to know of direct
infringement.‖).
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the safe harbor and therefore be able to pursue her contributory infringement claim.
The following sections demonstrate, however, that while the structure of the safe
harbors resembles that of a contributory infringement claim, the specific details of
the statutory provisions mean that at least in some situations sections 512(c) and
512(d) will shield OSPs from contributory infringement claims.
1. Material Contribution
Unlike a contributory infringement claim, the statute does not expressly state
that an OSP must induce, cause, or materially contribute to a user‘s infringing
activity in order to lose the benefit of the safe harbor under section 512(c) or
512(d). But an OSP only qualifies for the safe harbor if copyright infringement
occurs ―by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides‖
on the OSP‘s system or network, in the case of section 512(c), or ―by reason of the
provider referring or linking users to an online location containing infringing
material or infringing activity, by using information location tools,‖ in the case of
section 512(d).19 The statute‘s drafters evidently presumed that any OSP that could
come within the scope of the safe harbors was in fact materially contributing to any
infringement at issue by providing the online storage or the information location
tools ―by reason of‖ which the infringement occurred in the first place.
This view is reinforced by provisions in each section that allow an OSP to retain
the benefit of the safe harbor, even if the OSP acquires knowledge or awareness of
infringement, as long as it stops the activity that contributes to the infringement.20
Under section 512(c), a provider that stores infringing material for a user and finds
out about that infringing material will usually lose the safe harbor‘s shield. But if
the OSP, upon acquiring the requisite knowledge, removes or disables access to the
stored material, it remains protected by the safe harbor.21 Similarly, under section
512(d), an OSP that unknowingly links users to infringing material will remain
protected from liability if, once it finds out about the infringement, it disables
access to the material.22 Thus, the elements of knowing of the infringement and
facilitating that infringement by storing the user‘s infringing material or linking to
infringing activity must coalesce in order for the OSP to lose the safe harbor‘s
benefit and face possible liability for copyright infringement, just as a defendant
faces liability as a contributory infringer under ordinary copyright principles only if
it satisfies the elements of both knowledge and material contribution. The safe
harbor provisions and the elements of a contributory infringement claim therefore
likely do not substantively differ with respect to an OSP‘s material contribution to
infringement.

19.
20.
21.
22.

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1), (d) (2006).
17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(1)(A)(iii), 512(c)(1)(C), 512(d)(1)(C), 512(d)(3) (2006).
17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(1)(A)(iii), 512(c)(1)(C) (2006).
17 U.S.C. §§ 512(d)(1)(C), 512(d)(3) (2006).
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2. Knowledge: Knowledge of What?
Sections 512(c) and 512(d) thus proceed from the underlying premise that an
OSP that stores a user‘s infringing material, or provides information location tools
that lead a user to infringing material, necessarily assists in the user‘s infringement.
The specific conditions that an OSP must meet to qualify for the limitation on
liability focus on the OSP‘s knowledge. As noted above, both the safe harbors and
the common law contributory infringement doctrine contain a knowledge element.
Both, not surprisingly, recognize the defendant‘s ―actual knowledge‖ as one way to
satisfy the requirement. And just as the common law will impose liability even if a
defendant did not have actual knowledge—if the defendant should have known of
the infringing activity—so, too, the safe harbor provisions will not protect an OSP
who lacks actual knowledge but who nonetheless is ―aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.‖23
The safe harbors and common law doctrine appear to differ, however, as to what
knowledge a copyright owner must show in order to, respectively, remove an OSP
from a safe harbor or impose secondary liability on the OSP. Recall the Gershwin
statement of the contributory infringement test, which imposes liability on anyone
who contributes to another party‘s infringing conduct ―with knowledge of the
infringing activity.‖ This language is ambiguous. Does the defendant accused of
contributory infringement merely have to know that the activity is taking place? Or
must the defendant know that the activity constitutes infringement?
Few cases directly address this issue in the contributory infringement context.
Professor Goldstein, in his treatise Copyright, states that ―[t]o be liable for
contributory infringement, the defendant need only have known of the direct
infringer‘s activities, and need not have reached the legal conclusion that these
activities infringed a copyrighted work.‖24 Section 512, though, seems to take a
different approach, denying its protections to an OSP if the OSP knows of the
infringing nature of its user‘s material or activity, but not if the OSP merely knows
(or should know) that the activity is occurring. The statutory language, legislative
history and case interpretation all point to that conclusion.
The statutory language is clearest in articulating the actual knowledge required
to deprive an OSP of a safe harbor. Section 512(c)(1)(A)(i) allows an OSP to enjoy
the benefit of the safe harbor if the provider ―does not have actual knowledge that
the material or . . . activity . . . is infringing.‖25 Identical language appears in
section 512(d) regarding information location tools.26 These provisions clearly
require not only that the provider know of the existence of the infringing material
or activity, but rather that the provider know that it is infringing.27

23. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2006).
24. 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 8.1, at 8:9 n.1 (3d ed. 2008) (―This rule is
dictated by the more general rule that innocence is no defense to an action for copyright infringement.‖).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1)(A) (2006).
27. See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting
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The provisions of sections 512(c) and 512(d) that concern what the OSP should
know are more ambiguous. They deny protection to a provider that is ―aware of
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.‖28 As with the
statement of the common law claim in Gershwin, this could mean either that the
occurrence of the activity is apparent from the facts or circumstances, or that the
infringing nature of the activity is apparent. The legislative history makes clear,
however, that the drafters intended to require that the provider know of the
infringing nature of the activity. For example, the committee reports repeatedly
refer to this language as barring a provider from the safe harbor where the provider
has seen a ―red flag‖ of obvious infringement. The specific examples in the
committee reports make clear that the red flag must signal to the provider not just
that the activity is occurring, but that the activity is infringing. In describing the
operation of the ―red flag‖ test in connection with information location tools such
as Web directories, the committee explained that:
Absent such ―red flags‖ . . . , a directory provider would not be . . . aware merely
because it saw one or more well known photographs of a celebrity at a site devoted to
that person. The provider could not be expected, during the course of its brief
cataloguing visit, to determine whether the photograph was still protected by
copyright or was in the public domain; if the photograph was still protected by
copyright, whether the use was licensed; and if the use was not licensed, whether it
was permitted under the fair use doctrine.29

In these examples, the OSP is obviously more than just aware of facts from
which the user‘s activity is apparent—the provider has actually seen the user‘s
material. The examples make clear that this is not enough to meet the ―aware of
facts or circumstances‖ test set out in sections 512(c) and 512(d). Instead, the
question is whether the facts and circumstances make apparent the infringing nature

that if defendant OSP ―had actual knowledge of the infringing nature of the two subject newsgroups
even before being contacted‖ by plaintiff copyright owner, it would meet section 512(c)(1)(A)(i)‘s
condition for denying the safe harbor) (second emphasis added); but see Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1108 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (phrasing the issue under this subsection as
―whether [defendant] Amazon actually knew that specific [users] were selling items that infringed
[plaintiff] Corbis copyrights,‖ leaving unclear whether inquiry was whether Amazon knew of the sales
or knew that the items sold infringed).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2006); 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1)(B) (2006).
Unlike the common law knowledge standard, which may allow a court to ask if the contributory
infringement defendant should have been aware of the infringing activity, this statutory standard appears
to require that the defendant OSP was actually aware of the relevant facts and circumstances. Thus, one
court found that a copyright owner failed to disqualify an OSP under this condition where the copyright
owner did not present evidence suggesting that the OSP was in fact aware of the allegedly significant
facts. Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1149 & n.10 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (no
evidence that defendant was aware of plaintiff‘s trademark notice in a video clip uploaded by a user to
defendant‘s service, or of information in an uploading user‘s profile indicating the user‘s age). See also
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 53 (1998) (―In determining whether the service provider was aware of a
‗red flag,‘ the subjective awareness of the service provider of the facts or circumstances must be
determined.‖).
29. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 57-58 (1998).
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of the user‘s activity.
Those courts that have addressed the knowledge and awareness requirements
have interpreted them as requiring a showing of the OSP‘s mental state with respect
to the infringing nature of the activity at issue, and not merely with respect to the
existence of that activity. In Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, the Ninth Circuit
reviewed the copyright owner‘s claims that the defendants had the awareness of
facts and circumstances required by section 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) to disqualify them
from the safe harbor.30 In rejecting those claims, the court clearly focused on
whether the facts and circumstances identified by the copyright owner made the
defendants aware of the infringing nature of their users‘ activities, and not merely
that the activity was occurring. The copyright owner alleged, for example, that the
defendants ―must have been aware of apparent infringing activity‖ because they
provided services to websites at the domain names ―illegal.net‖ and
―stolencelebritypics.com.‖ The court disagreed:
When a website traffics in pictures that are titillating by nature, describing
photographs as ―illegal‖ or ―stolen‖ may be an attempt to increase their salacious
appeal, rather than an admission that the photographs are actually illegal or stolen.
We do not place the burden of determining whether photographs are actually illegal
on a service provider.31

Clearly, the relevant question in the court‘s mind was not whether the
defendants knew about the photographs, but whether they knew of the photos‘
infringing nature.32
Another court took a similar approach in Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com.33 The
copyright owner, Corbis, claimed that the defendant OSP, Amazon.com, was
precluded from using section 512(c)‘s safe harbor because it was aware of facts and
circumstances from which alleged infringing activity by its users was apparent.
Corbis argued that other copyright owners had sent notices of alleged infringement
to Amazon, and that these notices made Amazon aware of the relevant facts and
circumstances.34 The court concluded that ―the third party notices do not, in
30. 488 F.3d 1102, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2007).
31. Id. at 1114 (emphasis added).
32. The court took a similar approach with respect to claims that the defendants hosted
―password-hacking websites.‖ See id. It noted that for such a website:
[T]o qualify as a ‗red flag‘ of infringement [under section 512(c)(1)(A)(ii)], it would need to be
apparent that the website instructed or enabled users to infringe another‘s copyright . . . The
website could be a hoax, or out of date. The owner of the protected content may have supplied
the passwords as a short-term promotion, or as an attempt to collect information from
unsuspecting users . . . There is simply no way for a service provider to conclude that the
passwords enabled infringement without trying the passwords, and verifying that they enabled
illegal access to copyrighted material. We impose no such investigative duties on service
providers.
Id. Again, the court looked at whether the facts and circumstances put the OSP on notice of the
infringing nature of the activity that it was hosting, and not merely on notice of the existence of that
activity.
33. 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
34. On the question of the relevance of notice from copyright owners to a service provider‘s
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themselves, constitute red flags.‖35 It continued:
Outside of the fact that the [complained-of users] sold pictures of celebrities, Corbis is
silent regarding the content of the complained of listings. There is simply nothing to
suggest that the vendor listings contained evidence of blatant copyright infringement.
As a result, even if the notices of infringement would have caused Amazon to
examine the content of the [users‘] sites, Corbis has failed to close the link by
showing that those sites contained the type of blatant infringing activity that would
have sent up a red flag for Amazon.36

Again, the question for the court was not whether the notices made Amazon
aware that its users were selling the disputed items, but rather whether the notices
made Amazon aware of the infringing nature of those sales. In concluding that the
answer to that question was negative, the court distinguished between the statutory
standard and what seems to be the ordinary contributory infringement standard:
In determining whether a service provider is ―aware of facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity was apparent,‖ . . . the question is not ―what a reasonable
person would have deduced given all of the circumstances.‖ . . . Instead, the question
is ―whether the service provider deliberately proceeded in the face of blatant factors of
which it was aware.‖ . . . As articulated by Congress, apparent knowledge requires
evidence that a service provider ―turned a blind eye to ‗red flags‘ of obvious
infringement.‖37

The court thus articulated the statutory ―awareness‖ standard as more
demanding than the common law ―should have known‖ standard.
To the extent that a contributory infringement claim against an OSP for a
customer‘s infringement requires only that the OSP knows that the customer is
engaging in the allegedly infringing activity, but does not require that the OSP
knows that the activity is infringing, section 512‘s knowledge standard diverges
from the standard for secondary liability at common law. As a result, an OSP may
have knowledge that would be sufficient for a copyright owner to prevail on a
contributory infringement claim, but that knowledge may not be sufficient to
disqualify the OSP from the statutory safe harbor. In such a case, an OSP that
meets section 512‘s other requirements will not face infringement liability even
though it could be held liable under ordinary contributory infringement doctrine.
Section 512 therefore shields OSPs from certain otherwise viable secondary
liability claims, and not just from claims of direct infringement.
3. Knowledge: Notice from the Copyright Owner
The knowledge requirements of the safe harbors and a common law contributory
infringement claim also differ with respect to knowledge that comes by way of
knowledge for safe harbor purposes, see infra Part II.A.3.
35. Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1108.
36. Id. at 1109.
37. Id. at 1108 (citations omitted).
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notice from a copyright owner. One of the most direct ways that an OSP can obtain
knowledge of infringing material or activity on its system is if a copyright owner
tells the provider about the infringement. Courts applying the ordinary principles
of contributory infringement, in cases involving conduct of OSPs as well as those
involving non-Internet-related infringement, recognize that notice from the
copyright owner to the defendant can demonstrate that the defendant had the
knowledge necessary for imposing secondary liability.38 The safe harbors‘
requirements once again echo the ordinary principles of secondary liability in
recognizing that a copyright owner‘s notice can provide sufficient knowledge to
remove an OSP from a safe harbor. Section 512‘s notice-and-takedown system
provides that if a copyright owner gives an OSP notice of alleged infringement on
the OSP‘s system, the provider will generally lose the safe harbor‘s benefit unless it
expeditiously removes or blocks the allegedly infringing material.39
Here again, however, the two regimes differ in operational detail. Section 512
imposes more stringent requirements for a copyright owner‘s notice to remove an
OSP from a safe harbor than a contributory infringement cause of action requires
for such notice to satisfy the claim‘s knowledge element. Section 512(c) specifies,
in considerable detail, the elements that a copyright owner‘s notice must contain,
and even, to some degree, the form that notification must take, in order to trigger
the OSP‘s obligation to remove or block the allegedly infringing material in order
to remain within the safe harbor.40 If a copyright owner‘s notice to an OSP fails to
substantially comply with the form and content requirements, then the OSP need
not remove the complained-of material in order to stay within the safe harbor.41
This, of course, goes beyond the approach of common law contributory
infringement doctrine, which looks for no specific form or content in judging
whether notice from a copyright owner gives a defendant sufficient knowledge of a
third party‘s infringing activity.
The statute‘s form and content requirements have an even more significant
consequence beyond determining an OSP‘s obligation to remove or block
infringing material in order to retain the safe harbor‘s protection. The statute also
provides that, for the most part, a copyright owner‘s noncompliant notice cannot be
considered in determining, for purposes of the other safe-harbor knowledge
requirements, whether the OSP has actual knowledge of infringing material on its
system or is aware of facts and circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent.42
38. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc‘n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
39. 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(1)(C), 512(d)(3) (2006).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2006). Notices to OSPs regarding infringement by means of
information location tools must comply with essentially the same requirements. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(3)
(2006).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2006) (requiring expeditious response upon notification ―as
described in‖ section 512(c)(3)). Section 512(c)(3)(B)(ii) still requires that an OSP respond to some
noncompliant notices, though it does not require taking down or blocking infringing material.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i) (2006); see, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102,
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As a result, even where a copyright owner‘s statutorily inadequate notice in fact
gives an OSP actual knowledge that material stored on its network is infringing,
that knowledge will not disqualify the OSP from the safe harbor—even though an
OSP in such a situation would likely have sufficient knowledge to satisfy the
knowledge requirement of a common law contributory infringement claim. Thus,
with respect to notice from a copyright owner, the statute seems to impose a higher
standard than contributory infringement doctrine for a copyright owner‘s notice to
be effective in showing that an OSP had knowledge of the infringement. Here
again, section 512 does not preserve all copyright owners‘ secondary liability
claims against OSPs. Instead, the statute‘s elevated notice provision protects an
OSP against liability even in some circumstances when ordinary common law
contributory infringement standards would impose liability.
In sum, an OSP‘s knowledge is relevant both to a copyright owner‘s argument
that the OSP is not shielded from infringement claims by section 512‘s safe harbors
and to a copyright owner‘s claim of contributory infringement by the OSP. But
despite surface similarities, the knowledge requirements in each situation are rather
different. Section 512 requires a showing of greater knowledge on the OSP‘s part
to deprive it of a safe harbor‘s shield than the common law requires to hold an OSP
liable, as a contributory infringer, for its users‘ infringements. Section 512 thus
does not merely preserve what would otherwise be valid secondary liability claims
against OSPs. Instead, the statute draws on the ordinary common law principles of
secondary liability in determining whether an OSP qualifies for a safe harbor, but it
adapts those principles somewhat for the specific context of OSP activity, and in
doing so prevents a qualifying OSP, to some degree, from facing secondary
liability claims that it would otherwise face.
B. CONTROL-BASED DISQUALIFICATION FROM THE SAFE HARBORS AND
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
In addition to knowledge-based disqualifications, an OSP can also lose a safe
harbor‘s protection if it ―receive[s] a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity‖ and has ―the right and ability to control such activity.‖43 This
requirement, of course, parallels the common law doctrine for holding a defendant
vicariously liable for another person‘s copyright infringement: ―one may be
vicariously liable if he has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity
and also has a direct financial interest in such activities.‖44
Again, despite the parallel language between the statute and the elements of the

1113-14 (9th Cir. 2007); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1108 (W.D. Wash.
2004) (third-party notices to service provider could not be considered in determining service provider‘s
awareness of relevant facts and circumstances because copyright holder did not show that such notices
complied with statutory requirements.); Hendrickson v. Amazon.com, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 914, 917-18
(C.D. Cal. 2003); Hendrickson v. eBay Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1092-93 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2006).
44. Gershwin Publ‘g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
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common law claim, courts appear to have applied the two tests differently—in
particular with respect to the ―right and ability to control‖ element. Courts
interpreting section 512 have made clear that an OSP does not have the requisite
right and ability to control a user‘s infringing activity just because the OSP could
remove the user‘s stored material or terminate the user‘s access to the provider‘s
system or network.45 This interpretation makes sense, given that the OSP must be
able to remove material or terminate a user in order to qualify for the section 512(c)
and section 512(d) safe harbors in the first place. If the ability to remove a user‘s
stored material or access was enough to meet the ―right and ability‖ test under
section 512(c)(1)(B) or section 512(d)(2), then the test would essentially swallow
those safe harbors, as every relevant OSP would meet the test and be disqualified
from the safe harbor.
This interpretation appears to be a sensible approach to the structure of sections
512(c) and 512(d), although it has left the law somewhat at sea as to what does
constitute sufficient ―right and ability to control‖ for purposes of those safe
harbors.46 But that interpretation of the requisite ―right and ability to control‖
under section 512 certainly differs from how courts determine whether a defendant
has the requisite ―right and ability to supervise the infringing activity‖ to be held
vicariously liable under the common law test.47 Although few cases have
specifically applied the common law test to OSPs, those that have, and the logic of
other precedent, suggest that an OSP‘s right (under, for example, its terms of
service) and technological ability to remove a user‘s material or terminate a user‘s
access might well satisfy this element of a vicarious liability claim.48 Here again,
then, facts that could establish a prima facie vicarious liability claim would not
suffice to remove the OSP from the safe harbor and allow the claim to proceed, and
the safe harbor would offer the OSP some protection from secondary liability
claims.
Both the common law vicarious liability claim, and the section 512(c) and
512(d) safe harbors, also require considering an OSP‘s financial stake in a user‘s
infringing activity. If an OSP has the right and ability to control infringing activity,
it will not qualify for a safe harbor if it receives ―a financial benefit directly
attributable to the infringing activity.‖49 Similarly, under common law doctrines,
an OSP will only be vicariously liable for a user‘s infringing activities if it ―has a
direct financial interest in such activities.‖50 This parallel raises the question of
45. See, e.g., Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1150-54 (N.D. Cal.
2008); Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1110; Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1098
(C.D. Cal. 2004); CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 704 (D. Md. 2001);
Hendrickson v. eBay, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.
46. See, e.g., Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1151.
47. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Separating the Sony Sheep From the Grokster Goats, 50 ARIZ. L. REV.
577, 600-02 (2008).
48. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc‘n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1375-76 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
49. 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(1)(B), 512(d)(2) (2006).
50. Gershwin Publ‘g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2070824

REESE.FINAL

440

11/17/2009 5:42 PM

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[32:4

whether the level of financial benefit needed to disqualify an OSP from a safe
harbor is the same level of financial interest necessary to establish this element of a
vicarious liability claim. At least one court has held that the ―‗direct financial
benefit‘ [requirement in section 512(c)] should be interpreted consistent with the
similarly-worded common law standard for vicarious liability.‖51 That raises the
further questions of whether an interpretation of the statutory test that is ―consistent
with‖ the common law test might still differ in particular application, and how
courts are actually applying the statutory test.
These questions prove difficult to answer, principally due to uncertainty in both
contexts about what financial interest is required. Some uncertainty surrounds how
direct a defendant‘s financial interest must be to make an ordinary vicarious
liability claim. One leading case, Fonovisa, indicated that the test is met when a
third party‘s infringing activities ―enhance the attractiveness of the [vicarious
liability defendant‘s] venue to potential customers.‖52 That case involved a flea
market that rented space for a flat fee to vendors who allegedly sold infringing
sound recordings. The court ruled that the copyright owner had sufficiently alleged
direct financial interest by alleging facts that ―reflect that the defendants reap
substantial financial benefits from admission fees, concession stand sales and
parking fees, all of which flow directly from customers who want to buy the
counterfeit recordings at bargain basement prices.‖53 The Fonovisa opinion might
suggest that the availability of infringing material is necessarily a draw for
customers, and that the ―direct financial interest‖ test is therefore met whenever a
vicarious liability defendant receives payments from customers. But a subsequent
Ninth Circuit case, Ellison v. Robertson, seems to require that a copyright owner
prove that infringing material attracted paying customers, who otherwise would not
have paid, for the defendant‘s product or service.54 The suit included a claim that
AOL was vicariously liable for infringement Robertson committed when he posted
infringing copies of the plaintiff‘s literary works on one of the many USENET
newsgroups that AOL (and many other service providers) carried. In rejecting that
claim, the court explained that the ―essential aspect of the ‗direct financial benefit‘
inquiry is whether there is a causal relationship between the infringing activity and
any financial benefit a defendant reaps.‖55 Because the copyright owner in the case
had not offered any evidence that ―AOL customers either subscribed because of the
available infringing material or canceled subscriptions because it was no longer
available,‖ the court affirmed summary judgment for AOL on the vicarious liability
claim.
The Fonovisa opinion might be read to presume that payments not directly tied
to infringing activity constitute a direct financial interest in that activity because the
51. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1117 (9th Cir. 2007).
52. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263 (9th Cir. 1996).
53. Id.
54. 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004).
55. Id. at 1079. The court also stated that the infringing activity must constitute a ―draw‖ from
customers and ―not just an added benefit.‖ Id.
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activity draws more customers than would noninfringing activity—a reading that
arguably loosens the directness of the financial interest required to impose
vicarious liability. The Ellison court, however, read the Fonovisa opinion more
narrowly, and required proof that the infringing activity actually drew customers to
the defendant—a reading that maintains a more direct relationship between the
infringement and the defendant‘s financial interest.56 The broadest reading of
Fonovisa seems broader than the language of the safe harbor condition, which
requires that the OSP‘s benefit be ―directly attributable to the infringing activity.‖
The Ellison view, on the other hand, seems more consistent with that statutory
language.
What, precisely, the statutory language actually requires in practice, though, also
remains rather unclear. The ―financial benefit‖ requirement of the section 512 safe
harbors has received little judicial interpretation. Many cases that consider this
aspect of the safe harbor find that the OSP did not have the right and ability to
control the infringing activity, and so do not need to evaluate the financial
benefit.57 Other cases simply assume, or conclude without explicit analysis, that
the OSP received a sufficient financial benefit.58 The one circuit court case that has
so far addressed the requirement in any detail applied the same test that the Ellison
court applied to a common law vicarious infringement claim, and found that the
copyright owner had not sufficiently demonstrated ―that the infringing material was
a ‗draw‘ as required by Ellison.‖59
56. The Ellison reading seems entirely appropriate given that the Fonovisa court was reviewing
the district court‘s dismissal of the copyright owner‘s complaint for failure to state a claim, and therefore
was required to accept as true all of the complaint‘s allegations. The Fonovisa opinion therefore
established that allegations that infringing activity drew additional customers to a defendant‘s business
and the defendant received financial benefits from those additional could, if proven, meet the vicarious
liability test, but not that infringing activity necessarily or presumptively served as a draw.
57. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. eBay, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1093; Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1110;
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1105 (C.D.Cal. 2004), affirmed in part, reversed
in part, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007).
58. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. Amazon.com, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d at 918; Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh
Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1150.
59. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007).
Two earlier district court decisions, though, expressed seemingly different opinions on the relationship
between the statutory and common law tests, but did so in fairly inconclusive terms. The district court
in CoStar stated plainly that ―[b]oth the language and the purpose of the test for direct financial benefit
[in the statutory safe harbor] are different from the test‖ at common law, but the court appears to have
been comparing the statutory test to the common law claim for contributory infringement, not for
vicarious liability. CoStar Group Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 705 (D. Md. 2001)
(comparing statutory test to analysis in Fonovisa and Playboy Ent. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F.
Supp. 504 (N.D. Ohio 1997) of claims for ―contributory liability‖ and ―contributory infringement‖).
And the district court in Cybernet Ventures, acknowledging the CoStar court‘s discussion, ―expresse[d]
no opinion on the question whether the ‗directly attributable‘ language [in the statute] is narrower or
equivalent to the general vicarious infringement requirements,‖ but found the statutory test likely to be
met where the OSP received a payment from each customer who obtained adult verification services
from the OSP in order to view adult material, including allegedly infringing material, on websites that
accepted the OSP‘s verification services. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d
1146, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 2001). ―The more new visitors an infringing site attracts, the more money
Cybernet makes.‖ Id.
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Thus, while the statutory test for control-based disqualification from the safe
harbors clearly differs from the ordinary vicarious liability test with respect to the
right and ability to control infringing activity, it is unclear whether the test of an
OSP‘s direct financial interest in that activity is the same for purposes of
determining eligibility for the safe harbors and of imposing vicarious liability.
How much protection section 512 offers from vicarious liability claims depends on
whether, and to what extent, the financial interest requirements of the statute and
the common law diverge.
III. CONCLUSION
A view that the section 512(c) and 512(d) safe harbors shield OSPs from direct
infringement claims but allow copyright owners to hold OSPs secondarily liable for
their users‘ infringements may be a relatively accurate thumbnail account of these
statutory provisions. But that account overlooks some important detail, and this
Article attempts to provide a more nuanced picture. While the safe harbors do
protect OSPs against direct infringement claims, continuing judicial development
of the ordinary law of copyright infringement for OSPs outside the safe harbors
suggests that an OSP‘s potential direct infringement liability for its routine
functions may not be particularly great. And while the conditions that an OSP must
meet in order to qualify for these safe harbors closely parallel the elements of
common law contributory infringement and vicarious liability claims, those
conditions and elements differ in subtle but important ways. As a result, while in
many instances a copyright owner who can establish such a claim against an OSP
will also be able to disqualify that OSP from the safe harbor and pursue her claim,
in many other instances the safe harbor will insulate an OSP from secondary
liability claims that would, in the absence of section 512, succeed. Thus, the safe
harbors may be more valuable than they initially appear for OSPs facing secondary
liability claims, and less valuable than they initially appear for OSPs facing direct
infringement claims.
The fact that these statutory and common law regimes are quite similar and yet
not identical raises the questions of whether either approach might influence the
development of the other at the points where they differ, and whether the
differences might gradually disappear so that the two regimes converge. The safe
harbor approach to direct infringement claims may already have influenced the
judicial development of ordinary copyright infringement principles. As noted
above, several courts have agreed with the Netcom decision‘s rejection of direct
infringement liability for an OSP‘s routine and automatic operations. While those
courts found Netcom‘s analysis persuasive on its merits, at least one circuit court
also seemed to view Congress‘s endorsement of Netcom in the adoption and
legislative history of section 512 as important in choosing to follow that analysis.60

60. CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 552–55 (4th Cir. 2004); see also ALS
Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 622–23 (4th Cir. 2001).
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As for secondary liability, the common law claims and the statutory conditions
seem unlikely to converge when their differences are rooted in detailed statutory
language or the complex interaction of multiple statutory sections. For example,
while the statute requires that courts evaluating an OSP‘s level of knowledge not
consider a copyright owner‘s notice that does not meet the detailed statutory
requirements for form and content, a court has no reason in the ordinary case to
insist on those detailed requirements when considering whether a copyright
owner‘s notification gave a defendant sufficient knowledge for a contributory
infringement claim to succeed. And an OSP‘s right and ability to remove a user‘s
infringing material from its system or to terminate the user‘s access may well
remain sufficient in many instances to meet the first element of a common law
vicarious liability claim, even though, as discussed above, it would make little
sense to disqualify an OSP from the safe harbors based on that right and ability,
given the other statutory sections that require an OSP to take those actions.
The safe harbors‘ qualifying conditions might, though, influence one aspect of
ordinary secondary liability law: the kind of knowledge required for contributory
infringement liability. As noted above, the caselaw has paid little attention to
whether a contributory infringement defendant must know that infringing activity is
occurring or that the activity is infringing. To the extent that issue is unclear in
ordinary contributory infringement cases, if a court were to address the issue
expressly, it might well look to section 512 for guidance. Such a court might
conclude that Congress‘s approach in section 512 clarifies that the same approach
should be taken in contributory infringement cases generally, or instead that
Congress provided a special exception for OSPs that confirms the different rule in
ordinary cases. If courts do look to the statute in resolving that issue, how much
protection the section 512(c) and 512(d) safe harbors offer OSPs against
contributory infringement claims will depend in part on whether the statutory and
common law knowledge standards converge.
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